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Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are esti-mated to affect the lives of two million people in eastern Ukraine, restricting freedom of movement and access to key infrastructure and livelihoods.1 Estimates on casual-
ties vary widely and are often inconsistent. Nevertheless, estimates 
range between 1,600 and 3,600 military personnel and civilians who 
have fallen victim to mines and ERW since 2014.2
Recent contamination in the region is the result of the ongoing 
conflict between Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian sep-
aratists in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.3 Although the full extent 
of contamination is unknown, conservative estimates suggest that 
about 20 sq km (7.72 sq mi) are contaminated.4
Currently, at least three government institutions are directly in-
volved with humanitarian demining, with the support of three inter-
national NGOs.5 Many more organizations are involved in mine risk 
education (MRE), victim assistance, stockpile destruction, advocacy 
and training, advisory, and coordination of the mine action program. 
However, until January 2019, there was no strong legal framework 
to orchestrate these efforts.3 This article describes the current legal 
framework for mine action in Ukraine, analyzes the legislative pro-
cess and bureaucratic impediments, and briefly discusses the differ-
ent prospects of the newly-adopted mine action law.
Legislative Process
Representatives of mine action stakeholders in Ukraine agree 
that the obstacles to passing national legislation were not techni-
cal. Throughout the years, the mine action community has consoli-
dated lessons learned and developed best practices for developing 
national mine action laws.7–9 Moreover, international organizations 
have provided direct support to the Ukrainian government in help-
ing to overcome any technical obstacles.10 Yet, a specific legislation 
on mine action was approved only recently by the Ukrainian gov-
ernment. On 6 November 2018, the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) 
of Ukraine conducted the first reading of draft law No. 9080-1.11 
However, it was returned for further amendments, and internation-
al organizations were asked to present their thoughts and sugges-
tions.12 The second reading of the bill took place exactly one month 
later, and the legislation was approved on 6 December 2018.13 The 
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draft law was then forwarded to the Cabinet of Ministers, which ap-
proved the legislation on 25 January 2019.
Instead of technical issues, the main challenges seemed to be of 
a political nature, as the very exercise of passing a law is a strenu-
ous and time-consuming process. Moreover, the ongoing conflict 
has taken up most of the political attention and resources. Parallel 
to the conflict, the 2014 revolution triggered a series of reforms that 
are still taking place and most likely will continue to require politi-
cal attention.14 The new mine action legislation will inevitably lead to 
another reform, which would affect roles, responsibilities, and bud-
geting among government authorities. Needless to say, such changes 
are likely to prompt internal friction and disagreement.14 In addi-
tion, private interests pushed forward by commercial companies led 
to considerable disagreements over the framework of the future mine 
action legislation during negotiations.15 Despite lengthy discussions, 
former inaction, and other delays in the adoption of a mine action 
law, government authorities slowly came to an agreement of their 
shared roles and responsibilities.16 
Mine Action in Ukraine
The new law “On mine action in Ukraine” lays the legal and organi-
zational groundwork for conducting mine action in Ukraine and also 
highlights the peculiarities of exercising state regulation in this area.18
The law defines “the legal ground, objectives and principles, na-
tional interests of Ukraine in the mine action ambit, a list of the mine 
action objects and entities, the procedure of their creation together 
with organizational and procedural principles of operation; require-
ments to mine action and demining specialists and their responsibili-
ties; mine action sources of financing; the registration procedure for 
mine action operators, rendering assistance to blast victims, fram-
ing the status of territories intended for mine action purposes, etc.”13
Importantly, the law calls for a civilian-led mine action center, in 
order to “[provide] for regulations that govern democratic civic con-
trol in the field of mine action, the national interests of Ukraine in the 
field of mine action, the principles of international cooperation and 
implementation of economic activities in the field of mine action, in-
cluding liability insurance during mine clearance and public procure-
ment in the field of mine action.” The law also establishes the grounds 
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for procuring contracts for mine action services and provides liabil-
ity for violating the mine action legislation.13
The new legislation is to be implemented by mid-2019, includ-
ing the establishment of both the National Mine Action Authority 
and Mine Action Center.12 It provides the necessary legal framework 
and institutional structure to advance the mine action program in 
Ukraine. However, because the law was passed after the 2019 budget 
had been approved, there is no dedicated government budget for its 
implementation.19 Therefore, it is still uncertain how and when the 
law will be implemented.
Before and After the Mine 
Action Legislation
Prior to the conflict, a presidential decree established a National 
Mine Action Authority (NMAA) in Ukraine on September 2013. The 
Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Department of Environmental Safety 
and Mine Action was tasked to coordinate the in-country mine ac-
tion program, acting as the secretariat for the NMAA.3 At that time, 
the focus was on the destruction of stockpiles and legacy ERW from 
World War I and II.20
Figure 1. Mine and ERW casualties in eastern Ukraine.6
Figure courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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After the conflict erupted in 2014, the scope of the problem 
increased substantially, and many other actors joined the demining 
effort, including different government bodies, international organi-
zations, NGOs, and the private sector. Although the MOD remained 
the de facto coordinating body for humanitarian demining, it did not 
have the required authority over other ministries and government 
institutions currently involved in mine action. The coordination of 
MRE activities, for example, was mostly undertaken by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP)-led mine action subcluster, 
but not without flaws.21 There was sometimes poor or no coordination 
among partners performing MRE, with a high risk of leaving gaps in 
some areas and duplication of efforts in others.21 Likewise, local civil 
authorities in mine-affected communities did not seem to be informed 
about the scope of the problem and the location of hazardous areas 
in their region, let alone the current demining plans and activities.22
According to the mine action legislation passed in late January 2019, 
the new National Mine Action Authority should be “a permanent in-
terdepartmental collegial authority, set by the Cabinet of Ministers 
of Ukraine.”18 This structure should allow for better coordination 
among the different governmental authorities currently involved in 
mine action, although the challenge of ensuring local-level mine risk 
awareness and program support remains.
While Ukraine’s MOD is understandably mostly preoccupied with the 
ongoing conflict, it will remain the responsible authority for the priori-
tization of clearance tasks until the establishment of the National Mine 
Action Center by 25 April 2019. However, while immediate emergency 
and short-term security needs are a logical priority from a defense and 
security perspective, this might at times be contrary to long-term socio- 
economic perspectives and humanitarian objectives. For example, cer-
tain existing minefields might be regarded by the military as a necessary 
defensive obstacle and not be prioritized for clearance, even though it af-
fects a large number of civilians.
In the absence of national standards, Ukraine adopted the 
International Mine Action Standards in September 2016 as a provi-
sory measure until National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) were 
approved.3 With the support of international actors, the MOD has 
drafted different NMAS since 2016. However, even though most mine 
action operators had agreed to follow them, the standards were not 
binding without national legislation to enforce them.23 The MOD fi-
nalized the NMAS in late 2018 and, with the endorsement of the newly- 
passed national mine action legislation, expects to fully implement 
them by the end of 2019.18,24
However, as one of the consequences of the delayed legislation, 
there have been inconsistencies throughout the mine action program 
in Ukraine. First, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories 
and Internally Displaced Persons, for example, had developed its own 
standards for MRE, which then competed with the MOD’s. Second, 
information management has been subject to duplication of efforts 
and discrepancies. At least two main mine action datasets are cur-
rently in place, one managed by the MOD and another by the State 
Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU). There has been no clear di-
vision of responsibilities for data collection, especially for mine and 
ERW casualties, perhaps explaining the inconsistency and probable 
underreporting seen in this area.16,25 Moreover, the standards used 
for data entry differ from common international practice, leading to 
grossly overestimated figures for clearance activities.26 The new leg-
islation attempts to tackle those issues by abiding to the Information 
Management System for Mine Action and centralizing information 
under the National Mine Action Center.18
Unfortunately, compulsory accreditation and quality management 
processes were only recently established by the new mine action law.18 
Humanitarian demining organizations have operated under individ-
ual memorandums of understanding with the MOD and are tasked 
by its Coordinating Group for Mine Action. Clearance procedures 
National roundtable on national mine action standards in Kiev, 14 June 2018.22
Image courtesy of Miljenko Vahtaric, Technical Adviser on Humanitarian Mine Action, OSCE.
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were not externally verified before, during, or after execution and 
cleared land could not be officially released for use by the population. 
In the end of September 2018, the Ministry of Defense started its own 
accreditation process, but like the NMAS, they are only enforceable if 
backed up by the national legislation.24 The current legal framework 
establishes an Accreditation and Monitoring Commission, but that is 
yet to be implemented.18
Until the NMAA is established, stakeholders need to deal with 
multiple interlocutors and risk miscommunication. A European 
Union (EU)-funded project in support of the State Special Transport 
Service’s demining teams had to be closed after it was transferred 
from the auspices of the Ministry of Infrastructure to the MOD, be-
cause the EU could not support the Ukrainian military due to their 
funding policies.27 Some argue that the lack of a specific legal frame-
work caused concern and mistrust among prospective donors, thus 
limiting the availability of international funding.10,28 In order to ad-
dress these concerns, the newly established NMAA will be respon-
sible to act in the name of the state when dealing with international 
organizations within the sphere of mine action.18
An additional flaw was that the previous legal framework for 
mine action did not cover specific compensations and assistance 
for mine victims, deminers, and citizens who lost access to their 
livelihoods due to mine and ERW contamination. In fact, Ukrainian 
law only now distinguishes mine victims from other conflict-related 
victims.18,24 Even though the new legislation accounts for medical 
and socio-psychological support for victims of explosive ordnance, 
it only grants a one-time monetary compensation for persons under 
18 years old.19 Moreover, it does not address many of the legal 
disputes that may arise in terms of land rights and compensation for 
lost livelihoods.18
Finally, the absence of specific procurement provisions—an issue 
not addressed by the new legislation—has hindered import and us-
age of dual-use equipment and vehicles, such as mine detectors, ar-
mored vehicles, and explosives. International operators face a series 
of bureaucratic impediments to import dual-use material and until 
this day are not authorized to dispose of the mines and ERW found 
during clearance operations.16 Instead, the MOD or SESU explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams are required to dispose of items. This 
current practice puts an unnecessary burden on EOD units, slows 
down clearance operations, and leaves mines and ERW exposed for 
longer periods of time, increasing the risk of accidents and criminal 
use of the ordnance.23
Despite the general excitement with which the mine action commu-
nity received the newly adopted legislation, the law has raised serious 
concerns especially among donors. Article 8 states that “donor- 
sponsored financial resources are credited to a special fund of the 
state budget under the relevant budget programs.”24 In other words, 
donor funding should be pooled and managed by a government or-
ganization, and not directly by the implementing partners. While 
this provision was supported by representatives of the defense and 
security industry, it is unacceptable for most donors and could re-
sult in a large decrease, if not cessation, of funds from internation-
al donors.29,30 Nonetheless, Articles 20 and 28 assign the Ukrainian 
Cabinet of Ministers the responsibility to regulate mine action opera-
tors who are directly funded by donors. This raises the question of the 
legality of direct donor funding.19 The issue was raised, and member 
of parliament Ivan Vinnyk proposed the Ukrainian Parliament vote 
in the plenary session on whether to direct donor funding of mine ac-
tion, but the vote did not pass, and the question remains unanswered. 
Although the law is still valid, humanitarian mine action funding is 
at risk and is already impacting donor funding decisions relating to 
the future of continued mine action operations in Ukraine.31
Conclusion
Until January 2019, Ukraine did not have a national mine ac-
tion legislation. However, the lack of specific legislation was not an 
insurmountable challenge for humanitarian demining and relat-
ed activities. While important for addressing practical issues, such 
legislation is a crucial step toward ownership, and is an opportuni-
ty for a fresh start, to rectify working relationships, and adopt new 
procedures and higher-quality standards.13
Moreover, the new law is necessary to unleash the full potential 
of mine action in Ukraine by de-conflicting competing efforts and 
facilitating bureaucratic procedures. Furthermore, the new mine ac-
tion law shows Ukraine’s commitment to addressing the problem of 
contamination by mines and ERW and may enhance donor trust in 
funding a national program.14 Nevertheless, while the newly adopted 
legislation has clarified many inconsistencies of the Ukrainian mine 
action program, it has also shown significant gaps and created further 
uncertainty, especially in relation to direct donor funding and gov-
ernment budget for its implementation.19
Finally, while the new legislation is important now, it will be much 
more so when the conflict calms down. As the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine decreases in intensity and full clearance starts in the buffer 
zone, the number of operators and donors will likely increase, as will 
the need for better coordination and resource management.32 For 
now, with the support of international organizations, Ukrainian au-
thorities bear the greatest responsibilities in implementing the mine 
action legislation.
See endnotes page 69
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